the Court issued a highly fragmented ruling in a case raising the question of whether in-state service of process was sufficient to create general jurisdiction over a private defendant who was "tagged" with service of process in a divorce action while on a three-day business trip to the state of California. 3 Three years before that, in its immediately previous endeavor, the Court fragmented once again in ascertaining the circumstances under which a foreign manufacturer could be subjected to state-court jurisdiction when a component part it manufactured entered the forum state through the stream of commerce and caused injury. 2 495 U.S. 604 (1990) . 3 Id. at 607-10. 4 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Solano Cnty., 480 U.S. 102 (1987) .
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In each of these 4-4-1 decisions, 5 the Court's ultimate result was unanimous, 6 yet the clarity of the underlying holdings served to mask the stark ideological divisions that polarized the Justices. This was most pronounced in Burnham, which erupted into a debate, characteristic of the 1980s, between Justice Brennan, who had consistently maintained that the Due Process Clause and other parts of the Constitution must be read as evolving normative conceptions, and Justice Scalia, who prefers to articulate bright-line rules that are consistent with the purported intention of the Framers. 5 By "4-4-1," I refer to decisions characterized by two four-vote plurality opinions with one Justice joining neither and writing separately. Perhaps the most well-known of such decisions was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) . 6 In Burnham, the Court was unanimous in concluding that California's exercise of jurisdiction over defendant Burnham was proper because he was served process in California, even though he was only present in the state for three days. 495 U.S. at 640. Likewise the Asahi Court was unanimous in concluding that California's exercise of jurisdiction over a Japanese firm on a cross-complaint for indemnification was unreasonable and violated due process notions of fair play and substantial justice because neither the original plaintiff nor the state of California had any interest in securing a California forum for the litigation. 480 U.S. at 114-16. Justice Scalia refused to join Section II-B of Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, and was thus the only Justice to suggest that the fairness factors could not be utilized to invalidate a finding of minimum contacts. 480 U.S. at 104. 7 Justice Scalia argued for a plurality of the Court in Burnham that the in-state service of process rule has been firmly in place since Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), and none of the subsequent developments under the minimum-contacts doctrine, which involved defendants served out-of-state, altered this approach. Therefore, Scalia saw no need for a "fair play and substantial justice" analysis of whether California's exercise of jurisdiction over Burnham violated due process. As Scalia stated:
[T]he concurrence's proposed standard of "contemporary notions of due process" requires more: it measures state-court jurisdiction not only against traditional doctrines in this country, including current statecourt practice, but also against each Justice's subjective assessment of what is fair and just. Authority for that seductive standard is not to be found in any of our personal jurisdiction cases. It is, indeed, an outright break with the test of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," which would have to be reformulated "our notions of fair play and substantial justice." Burnham, 495 U.S. at 623 (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan argued for a different plurality in Burnham that a minimum-contacts analysis had to be performed for all assertions of state court jurisdiction as the Court had previously held in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) , and this included an assessment of whether the exercise of jurisdiction was consistent with a "fair play and substantial justice analysis." Burnham, 495 U.S. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). As Brennan stated: "The critical insight of Shaffer is that all rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due process." Id. Having neglected this area for an entire generation, almost any new decision of the Court would be worthy of close attention. But the case the Court agreed to hear was also clearly a compelling one, addressing the ability of a United States plaintiff to sue the foreign manufacturer of a product in the state where the injury caused by the product occurred. Because of increased globalization, more and more products that have been manufactured abroad are ending up in the United States marketplace, 9 suggesting that these cases will proliferate in the future. However, in its response to these developments, the Court issued yet another fragmented decision. In a plurality opinion, bolstered into a majority by two votes from Justices who agreed with the result of the plurality but not its reasoning, the Court ruled that a foreign manufacturer who consciously targeted the entire United States market and sold products through an independent American distributor, could not be subject to jurisdiction in a New Jersey state court under the stream of commerce theory, absent a showing that it had sold "sizeable quantities" of its product in the state of New Jersey. 10 As a consequence 8 The dearth of Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases during this twenty-year period cannot be attributed to consensus regarding the doctrine in the lower courts. In Goodyear, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed a lower court decision that, in its reach to assert jurisdiction, collapsed the distinction between specific jurisdiction, [Vol. 16:269 of this ruling, a worker-plaintiff who suffered a severe and disabling injury while using the manufacturer's product at his place of employment, and in his state of residence, was forced to abandon his litigation in New Jersey and travel to England to adjudicate his claim before a foreign legal system. The holding was a big win for the business community over plaintiffs, 11 and is feared to have established a blueprint for multinational corporations to follow in order to avoid products liability suits in the United States. 12 As Justice Kennedy stated in his plurality opinion for the Court, J. McIntyre presented an opportunity to clarify the circumstances in which a state court can exercise specific jurisdiction over the foreign manufacturer of a product that has entered the state and caused an injury, an issue left unresolved after the Asahi decision of 1987. 13 This Article argues that the Court woefully failed to accomplish that goal. After a summation of the New Jersey litigation, the Article postulates a set of goals that Justice Kennedy sought to attain in his opinion for the Court and the extent to which he satisfied them, in light of the fact that he was only able to get three additional members of the Court, Justices Scalia, Thomas and Roberts, to go along with his reasoning. These goals included: establishing that the far reaching opinion of the New Jersey Supreme Court could not be sustained consistently with the plurality's reading of Supreme Court precedent; reining in the "stream of commerce theory" as a means of establishing state court jurisdiction; minimizing the "fairness factors" as an independent wing of where the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of or relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum state, and general jurisdiction, where there is no such relationship. Although the Supreme Court has decided a series of general jurisdiction cases, the discussion of these differences first appeared only in brief footnotes, providing some insight into the confusion of the North Carolina courts and others. , at A1 (reporting on a study by the Constitutional Accountability Center concluding that the Roberts Court has sided with the Chamber of Commerce 68% of the time compared with 56% of the time during the last eleven years of the Rehnquist Court). The United States Chamber of Commerce is a pro-business advocacy group that files "friend of the court" briefs in Supreme Court cases. The Chamber and its "Chamber Litigation Center" claim to be the "voice of business in the courts on issues of national concern to the business community." Id.
12 Cf. J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2795 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Inconceivable as it may . . . appear[ ] . . . the splintered majority today turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern long arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into a court where a user was injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having independent distributors market it." (citation and internal quotations omitted)). 13 Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion).
the personal jurisdiction analysis that can be used by a plaintiff to establish jurisdiction; and setting Internet-conscious rules for future personal jurisdiction cases. Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion also sought to destabilize Justice Brennan's personal jurisdiction legacy, a jurisprudence that sought to assure that plaintiffs have fair and reasonable access to the courts to adjudicate their claims. ating the machine in the normal course of employment.
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The trial court dismissed Nicastro's suit not once, but twice, due to lack of personal jurisdiction. After the first dismissal, Nicastro appealed to the New Jersey Appellate Division, which reversed the trial court. In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Division ordered discovery to ascertain whether the trial court could exercise jurisdiction under: 1) a traditional minimum contacts analysis; 2) under Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Asahi; or 3) under an independent "stream of commerce" theory, identified in the 1986 New Jersey Supreme Court decision, Charles Gendler Co. v. Telecom Equipment Company.
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After discovery, the trial court again dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that J. McIntyre had no contacts with the state of New Jersey, as it did not solicit business in the state or have any physical presence in the state. While J. McIntyre had contact with the United States, the trial court reasoned, such contact was not sufficient to allow jurisdiction to be exercised in New Jersey, absent some indication that J. McIntyre engaged in a nationwide distribution scheme that purposefully brought products into New Jersey and allowed it to benefit from the protection of New Jersey's laws. 21 The Appellate Division reversed the trial court a second time, stating that it had "no hesitancy" in finding that New Jersey could exercise jurisdiction over J. McIntyre. That court determined that jurisdiction was proper because it would not violate "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," and was justified under Justice O'Connor's "stream of commerce" rationale in Asahi.
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The court found that J. McIntyre had placed the shearer in the stream of commerce by shipping it to McIntyre America, and had know- 19 Nicastro, 201 N.J. at 53. This claim was based on the absence of a safety guard that plaintiff asserted would have prevented the accident. 20 Id. at 53-54. In Charles Gendler & Co., Inc. v. Telecom Equipment Corp., 102 N.J. 460 (1986), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the stream of commerce theory supports jurisdiction if a manufacturer knew or reasonably should have known that a distribution system has brought the product it manufactured into the forum state, even though the manufacturer did not control the distribution system. In Gendler, the court reasoned that the manufacturer's awareness of the distribution system by which it receives economic and legal benefits "justifies subjecting the manufacturer to the jurisdiction of every forum in every jurisdiction within its distributor's market area." Id. at 481. Thus, a manufacturer that is aware that its product is being distributed nationwide should be subject to jurisdiction in every state. To avoid this result the manufacturer must "attempt to preclude the distribution and sale of its product in that state." Id. Supreme Court, or by six Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, this pioneering analysis allowed the New Jersey Supreme Court to conduct an end run around the "traditional" understanding of minimum contacts, substituting in its place the analysis from Gendler. Once this had been accomplished, the case was a sure shot for jurisdiction, as the fairness factors all pointed toward New Jersey as a forum for the plaintiff consistent with notions of fair play and substantial justice.
II. ANALYSIS-NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruling in Nicastro 28 is one of the most far-reaching decisions ever written in the law of personal jurisdiction. Bold and historical, Justice Albin's opinion, in its emphasis on providing plaintiff access to the New Jersey courts, bears an uncanny resemblance to the numerous Warren Court-era decisions in which the Supreme Court confidently established everbroader parameters in its efforts to expand the promises of American democracy through enhanced access to the courts and the political process.
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As the following discussion suggests, Nicastro was hardly flawless, but it nonetheless came to a conclusion more consistent with Supreme Court precedent than the Supreme Court's fragmented ruling in J. McIntyre.
The Nicastro decision begins with a sweeping historical overview, taking up almost half its length, providing a recap of the law of personal jurisdiction beginning with the rule of Pennoyer v. Neff 30 and continuing through Asahi and lower court decisions construing it. The thrust and underlying premises of the historical analysis was clear: by documenting the Supreme Court's adjustment of the rules governing personal jurisdiction to remain current with the shifting demands of a dynamic society, particularly changes regarding transportation technology and the organization of the business corporation, the New Jersey Supreme Court suggested that in the thirty years since Asahi was decided, further transformations in the American economy mandated additional tweaks in the jurisdictional rules and that, as in the past, the courts should lead the 28 Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State. Gendler upheld New Jersey state court jurisdiction over a Japanese manufacturer who, through its New York subsidiary, sold an 31 The opinion begins:
Today, all the world is a market. In our contemporary international economy, trade knows few boundaries, and it is now commonplace that dangerous products will find their way through purposeful marketing, to our nation's shores and to our state. allegedly defective telephone system to an independent New Jersey corporation, which then sold it to the New Jersey office of the Gendler company. Recognizing the expansion of state court jurisdiction authorized by numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, the Gendler court explained that the enlargement of state court jurisdiction "has special relevance for foreign corporations engaged in commercial activities in the United States" because of the "metamorphosis" of the United States from a domestic to an international economy.
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The Gendler court based its holding on the basis that the Japanese manufacturer and distributor placed at the start of a distribution chain served a large market and "purposefully conducted their activities to make their product available for purchase in as many forums as possible. For such a manufacturer, the sale of a product in a distant state is not simply an isolated event but a result of the corporation's efforts to cultivate the largest possible market for its products."
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According to the Gendler court:
[F]oreign manufacturers derive benefits from the indirect sales of products throughout the United States. By increasing the distribution of its products, the manufacturer not only benefits economically from indirect sales to foreign residents, but also benefits from protection provided by the laws of the forum state. Thus, a manufacturer that distributes its products into the stream of commerce for widespread distribution derives both legal and economic benefits from the states in which its products are sold. In sum, the system through which the manufacturer distributes its products evidences the manufacturer's purposeful penetration of the market.
A foreign manufacturer that purposefully avails itself of those benefits should be subject to personal jurisdiction, even though its products are distributed by independent companies, or by an independent, but wholly owned subsidiary. 39 The Gendler court noted the widespread use of middlemen to act as distributors for a manufacturer's products and asserted that to allow a manufacturer to "shield itself from liability for damages caused by its products distributed by those middlemen would permit a legal technicality to subvert justice and economic reality in the worst sense." 40 Gendler concluded that if a manufacturer benefits from the sales of its products through a distributor and is aware 37 Id. at 474. 38 Id. at 477-79. 39 Id. at 478-79 (citations omitted). 40 Id. at 479 (citations omitted).
that a distribution network is carrying its products through a nationwide distribution system, the manufacturer should expect that its products will be sold in each state and furthermore that it will be subject to jurisdiction in each state.
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Gendler was therefore the key guidepost for the New Jersey Supreme Court in deciding Nicastro.
Following its extensive discussion of Gendler, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Nicastro next looked to Asahi, to see whether it undermined the Gendler analysis. Parsing the three Asahi opinions, the court noted that a majority opinion could not be mustered in answer to the question posed by Justice O'Connor at the outset of her plurality opinion.
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While four Justices agreed with Justice O'Connor's stream of commerce "plus" theory, requiring some additional intentional conduct by the manufacturer to demonstrate purposeful availment such as advertising, marketing, or use of a distributor to serve the forum state, three different Justices agreed with the theory articulated by Justice Brennan, which did not require any additional conduct but only awareness on the part of the manufacturer that the product it manufactured had entered the forum state causing injury. 43 The Nicastro court noted the many lower court cases decided after Asahi, recognizing that some adopted the O'Connor view, some the Brennan view, while others either refused to choose between the two approaches or somehow combined them. 44 Even more noteworthy than the continuing conflict amongst the federal circuit and state courts after Asahi was the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari in these cases, irrespective of whether they adopted the O'Connor or Brennan view. Once the stream of commerce requirements under Gendler were satisfied, establishing the reasonableness of jurisdiction was straightforward. The fairness factors all pointed toward New Jersey as a forum consistent with notions of fair play and substantial justice. The defendant would not be burdened by coming to New Jersey since it had made over twenty-six visits to the United States to market its product at ISRI scrap metal conventions-indeed attending every ISRI convention held between 1990 and 2005. 47 Moreover, the plaintiff had an extremely strong interest in litigating the case in New Jersey, where he lived and worked and which Leonardo, 892 P.2d 1354 (Ariz. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 906 (1995), a case sustaining jurisdiction on facts almost identical to those of Nicastro. In that case the Arizona parents of a two-year-old child who was killed in an accident involving a firearm sued the Italian manufacturer of the weapon in a products liability action in an Arizona court. The manufacturer utilized at least eight American distributors who targeted the entire United States market for distribution of the firearm but had not specifically targeted Arizona and had no control over the actions of the U.S. distributors. The Arizona Supreme Court ruled that to reject jurisdiction because Arizona was not specifically targeted "turns common sense on its head" and "defies economic logic" because
[d]ue process does not give foreign companies a safe harbor to manufacture goods designed for and shipped to America and at the same time immunize them from the penalties of noncompliance with American safety standards. Such a rule would drive American manufacturers out of business while allowing foreign businesses to produce, with absolute immunity, unreasonably dangerous and defective products for the American market. Id. at 1363. This was especially true because the defendant "could have avoided the risk of products liability in Arizona by making some affirmative effort to preclude distribution of its products in [the] state." Id. at 1363 n.8.
The Supreme Court also denied certiorari in Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 914 (1993). In that case, a Kentucky plaintiff sued a Netherlands-based drug company in a Kentucky court for the ill effects of a drug she had taken during her pregnancy. After removal to the federal court, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, claiming that "it has done nothing in particular to purposefully avail itself of the Kentucky market as distinguished from any other state in the union." Tobin, 993 F.2d at 544. The Sixth Circuit rejected the argument concluding that "[i]f we were to accept defendant's argument on this point, a foreign manufacturer could insulate itself from liability in each of the fifty states simply by using an independent national distributor to market its products . . . ." Id. 46 See, e.g., McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2804-06 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing "illustrative cases" upholding jurisdiction under similar facts to those presented in Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion). 47 Id. at 2796.
was also the location of the accident and thus where the cause of action arose. The plaintiff's interest is especially noteworthy, when considering that the only alternative forum was the foreign legal system of the United Kingdom, a long and expensive trek for a severely disabled worker from New Jersey. These reasons also support the interest of the state of New Jersey in adjudicating the action, as it certainly wished to protect its consumers, even if only to the extent of assuring them a fair day in court.
III. IN THE SUPREME COURT

A. Kennedy's Goals
Confronted with this extraordinary decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court, Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion was written with a number of purposes in mind, which emanate from the decision itself.
1) A central purpose was to correct the New Jersey Supreme Court's view that the stream of commerce theory provided an alternative way of asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that would obviate the need for a direct finding of minimum contacts. As we have seen, the New Jersey Supreme Court proclaimed the existence of jurisdiction while simultaneously denying the existence of minimum contacts, 49 an approach that, whether viewed as a remarkable exercise of judicial candor-or the hoisting of the red flag of rebellion-certainly served as a provocation, catching the Court's attention in a way that similar cases had not. If understood as a provocation, the extent of it could only have been exacerbated by the New Jersey Supreme Court's additional suggestion that its decisional preference was to find jurisdiction on the facts of the case.
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Although noting that the New Jersey Supreme Court 48 Nicastro, 201 N.J. at 79-80. 49 Id. at 61. 50 "We cannot evade consideration of the stream of commerce theory for it is the only basis on which the English manufacturer could be subject to the jurisdiction of a New Jersey court." Id. at 72. Similar concerns appeared to motivate the Appellate Division:
To allow a foreign manufacturer to shield itself from liability in damages caused by its products distributed by those middlemen would be to permit a legal technicality to subvert justice and economic reality in the worse sense. Foreign manufacturers should not be allowed to insulate themselves by using intermediaries in a chain of distribution or by professing ignorance of the ultimate destination of their products. issued an "extensive opinion with careful attention to this Court's cases and to its own precedent," 51 from Justice Kennedy's perspective, however, the New Jersey decision was driven by a "metaphor" that "cannot be sustained." 52 2) Recognizing, however, that the stream of commerce remains a valid way of establishing minimum contacts, Justice Kennedy had the additional goal of clarifying the confusion surrounding the circumstances in which the stream of commerce theory can provide a basis for minimum contacts. 53 As the plurality explained, since the Asahi decision, lower courts have been divided on whether to follow Justice Brennan's approach, which allowed for the assertion of jurisdiction over a defendant if its product caused injury in the forum state and the defendant was aware of a regular and anticipated flow of its commerce into the forum state, or Justice O'Connor's view that mere awareness isn't sufficient, and that advertising, marketing, and targeted acts of a distributor are also necessary. 54 Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion asserts the view that the correct approach was reflected in the Asahi plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor. The relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that it is reasonable . . . to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered His strategy for accomplishing this, however, was to revive the discredited sovereignty prong of minimum contacts doctrine and reinsert it back tected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum; the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). 57 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 325 (1945) (opinion of Black, J.) ("There is a strong emotional appeal in the words 'fair play', 'justice', and 'reasonableness.' But they were not chosen by those who wrote the original Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment as a measuring rod for this Court to use in invalidating State or Federal laws passed by elected legislative representatives. No one, not even those who most feared a democratic government, ever formally proposed that courts should be given power to invalidate legislation under any such elastic standards."). Professor Freer has noted that after his opinion in International Shoe, Justice Black authored majority opinions in the first two specific jurisdiction cases to apply the minimum contacts analysis. See Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1950); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-24 (1957) . In both cases, Justice Black used the fairness factors as part of a "ménage" of concerns to be balanced by the courts to determine whether an exercise of jurisdiction was "reasonable," and found jurisdiction in both instances. Freer, supra note 14, at 554-62. 58 See supra p. 2 and note 7. Justice Scalia's resemblance to Justice Black is very different from that of Justice Brennan's. Whereas Black and Scalia oppose the use of elastic fairness factors to allow a defendant to avoid jurisdiction once minimum contacts have been established, Black and Brennan have both sought affirmatively to utilize the fairness factors as a way of gauging whether individual, fact-specific aspects of a case could be juggled to establish jurisdiction for the plaintiff. 59 Justice Scalia began his Burnham opinion with only three Justices on board, with Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and White joining sections I, II-A, II-B, and II-C. See 495 U.S. 604, 607 (plurality opinion). By the time he got to Sections II-D and III, which included his attack on Justice Brennan, he had only two, one of whom was Justice Kennedy. Id. at 619-28.
60 "Freeform notions of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the absence of authority into law." J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787 (2011) (plurality opinion). "Furthermore, were general fairness considerations the touchstone of jurisdiction, a lack of purposeful availment might be excused where carefully crafted judicial procedures could otherwise protect the defendant's interests, or where the plaintiff would suffer substantial hardship if forced to litigate in a foreign forum." Id. at 2789.
into the analysis, creating additional confusion in an area of law already in great disarray. 4) A final goal for Justice Kennedy was to establish a set of personal jurisdiction rules that are Internet-conscious, that is, rules that are developed with awareness of the role the Internet plays in our contemporary society. None of the current doctrinal understandings of personal jurisdiction can claim such consciousness, as they were developed before today's Internet proliferation. While J.
McIntyre did not present questions of Internet jurisdiction, one can assume that the Court was aware of its lurking presence because at least one amicus curiae brief argued that it was essential for the Court to clarify the circumstances in which Internet presence in the forum state can be deemed advertising in the forum state.
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There was also considerable attention directed to Internet jurisdiction at oral argument.
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Having been absent from the personal jurisdiction area for twenty years, during which time a tremendous amount of Internet commercial and technical innovation occurred, it would be perplexingly remiss for the Court to ignore the need for present day jurisdictional rules that are attentive to the extraordinary commercial and non-commercial role the Internet has assumed in American life. Moreover, the Court must proceed on the assumption that future cases that do present Internet issues would rely on the personal jurisdiction rules articulated in J. McIntyre, even though Internet issues were not present in the case. 63 Indeed, the significant concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, specifically stated that those Justices were not joining Kennedy's opinion because it appeared to apply to the Internet "strict rules that limit jurisdiction where a defendant 'does not intend to submit to the power of the sovereign' and 'cannot be said 61 See Brief for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (No. 09-1343), 2010 WL 4803147, at *26 ("Nonetheless, assuming that this Court adopts some form of the 'additional conduct' test, the case does provide an appropriate vehicle to gloss the meaning of 'advertising in the forum state' in light of the rapid technological changes that have occurred over the last decades. Specifically, in order to provide a 'degree of predictability' to companies, the Court should make clear that, at a minimum, the mere presence on the Internet does not constitute 'advertising in the forum state.'") 62 63 One early commentator has predicted that after McIntyre "geographical borders will become relevant in the Internet context, and thus courts will be more hesitant to look to broader Internet conduct to justify jurisdiction. Instead courts will be forced to determine whether the website operator or seller targeted a particular forum. 
B. The Supreme Court Decision
The Kennedy plurality held that jurisdiction over Nicastro's suit was not authorized under current law.
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Justice Kennedy concluded, first, that the stream of commerce is not a substitutive way of establishing personal jurisdiction that allows a plaintiff to sidestep a finding of purposeful availment. 66 Second, even in a case where the stream of commerce theory is being used to ascertain purposeful availment, the correct reading of the Asahi precedent is the approach adopted by Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion, which was not followed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 67 Third, no matter how strong the fairness factors may point to the exercise of jurisdiction, they can only be utilized to protect a defendant from jurisdiction in circumstances where minimum contacts, through a purposeful availment analysis, have been found-they may not be used to justify an exercise of jurisdiction for the plaintiff.
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The plurality decision was bolstered into a majority by a twoJustice concurrence that explicitly rejected the reasoning of the plurality but agreed with its result. But what do these standards mean when a company targets the world by selling products from its website? And does it matter if, instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns a product through an intermediary (say, Amazon.com), who then receives and fulfills the orders? And what if a company markets its products through pop up advertisements that it knows will be viewed in the forum? . . . I do not agree with the plurality's strict no-jurisdiction rule.
Id.
65 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (plurality opinion). 66 Id. at 2788. 67 Id. at 2789. 68 Id. at 2787. See id. at 2789 ("Furthermore, were general fairness considerations the touchstone of jurisdiction, a lack of purposeful availment might be excused where carefully crafted judicial procedures could otherwise protect the defendant's interests, or where the plaintiff would suffer substantial hardship if forced to litigate in a foreign forum."). 69 Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring). 70 Id. at 2792 ("None of our precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient. Rather, this strict no-jurisdiction rule that requires evidence showing that the defendant "inten[d] to submit to the power of a sovereign" and can "be said to have targeted the forum."
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The concurring opinion can thus be read to suggest that if some threshold number of machines had been sold in New Jersey above and beyond the one machine suggested by the Nicastro record, the concurring Justices may have allowed a finding of jurisdiction even though J. McIntyre had not engaged in any of the "plus" factors demonstrating purposeful availment demanded by Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Asahi.
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The concurring Justices were clearly on to something. While there was ample precedent justifying the New Jersey Supreme Court's expansion upon current doctrine to accommodate new economies and corporate business practices, and thus allow jurisdiction in New Jersey, there were also reasons that should have led the court to pause. The seeds of the difficulty were planted in Gendler, the central New Jersey precedent for Nicastro, where they germinated until their eruption in the J. McIntyre Supreme Court opinion. The problem identified by the Gendler court itself on the facts before it was the puzzling and disturbing lack of clarity as to the exact number of phone systems that were sold to plaintiff Gendler in New Jersey, an important issue for addressing the extent to which Nippon, the Japanese defendant, purposefully availed itself of the benefits of selling its telephones in the state. 
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For Justices Breyer and Alito, the number was too small to pass muster even under Justice Brennan's analysis in Asahi.
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This was central to their holding that jurisdiction could not be exercised, and was thus crucial to the Court's ultimate tiff to submit proof that its purchase of Nippon telephones was not a fortuitous event, but the result of an established distribution system for Nippon's telephone systems. Id. at 483-84. 74 Id. at 482. 75 See id. at 484 ("It is not necessary that a manufacturing corporation wholly own the distributing subsidiaries. 77 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Justice Brennan in Asahi to the effect that "jurisdiction should lie where a sale in the state is part of 'the regular and anticipated flow' of commerce into the State, but not where that sale is only an 'edd[y],' i.e., an isolated occurrence."). Justice Ginsburg argued in dissent that each of the machines was valued at $24,900, which would represent a "significant sale" if, dollar for dollar, the product sold were flannel shirts, cigarette lighters, or wire-rope splices, each of which were enough to trigger jurisdiction in cases decided by the U.S. Courts of Appeals. See id. at 2803 n.15 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). disposition of the case.
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Of course, from another perspective, the absence of direct evidence of J
However, even considering the small number of machines that entered New Jersey, the case can be distinguished from Asahi because the shearing machine that caused Nicastro's injury, priced at $24,000, was of significant value, and was independently hazardous in its own right if defective, thus subject to a different analysis than the valve stem components that allegedly caused injury in Asahi. 79 Professor Peterson has dismissed as "spurious" the suggestion that there has to be more than one product sold in the forum state to establish purposeful availment. a business process that is largely characterized by U.S. middlemen operating at the behest of foreign corporations who are seeking to penetrate the national United States marketplace. If a foreign corporation has knowledge of this marketing, with sufficient control over it so as to be able to refrain from shipping its products to certain areas, but hasn't done so in order to earn a greater profit, it should be held accountable in jurisdictions where the product causes injury, even if only one product has entered the forum state, provided that the product is a not a component part and is hazardous on its own terms.
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The plurality's determination to curtail the power of state courts to exercise jurisdiction over non-resident corporations under the compelling circumstances present in J. McIntyre suggests hostility to a minimum contacts doctrine that would uphold an assertion of jurisdiction in circumstances where there is a strong, but not definitive, showing of minimum contacts, coupled with fairness factors that point overwhelmingly in favor of jurisdiction in the forum chosen by the plaintiff. A close reading of Justice Kennedy's opinion suggests that he was aware that an alternative, more plaintiff-friendly approach to the law of personal jurisdiction was possible. Not only had such an alternative been argued by at least one amici, 85 but also Justice Brennan had long been a proponent of a relaxed, pro-access approach to the courts that he articulated in a number of decisions, including a stream-of-commerce analysis that would make it easier for plaintiffs to hold non-resident defendant corporations accountable in plaintiff's home state for defective products that have made their way into the forum state's borders. Kennedy's plurality decision was forced to grapple with these decisions but garbled and discussed them with barely veiled contempt. However, in his attempt to refute Justice Brennan's views, Kennedy may have gone so far as to alienate the two Justices necessary to convert his plurality opinion into a majority. To fully grasp this point, it will be necessary to underscore certain aspects of the personal jurisdiction doctrine that are clearly manifest in the Court's analysis even though the Court has yet to explicitly spell them out.
1) Minimum Contacts
Since International Shoe, 86 minimum contacts doctrine has been harnessed by two prongs, carved out from Justice Stone's allowance of personal jurisdiction in cases where (1) the existence of minimum contacts is (2) combined with circumstances where the exercise of jurisdiction does not violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. 87 Writing in World-Wide Volkswagen, Justice White sought to give meaningful content to each of these prongs. In his initial view, minimum contacts was articulated as securing the goals of federalism and state sovereignty by preventing courts from extending their jurisdictional reach beyond their borders to exercise jurisdiction over persons of a different sovereign. 88 
However, in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
89
decided shortly thereafter, Justice White retreated from this earlier understanding, and identified the minimum contacts doctrine as necessary to protect the "liberty interest" of an out of state defendant in not being subjected to the courts of a foreign sovereign, absent some indication that the defendant had sought to benefit from the laws of that sovereign. 90 While acknowledging the Court's repudiation of the so-called "sovereignty" prong analysis in Ireland, Justice Kennedy nonetheless pivoted his analysis around notions of sovereignty in J. McIntyre Justice Kennedy's reinsertion of sovereignty notions into the minimum contacts analysis was combined with a deliberate downplay of the role of fundamental fairness, a co-equal part of the minimum contacts doctrine that has traditionally been associated with the Due Process Clause, and further operated to discredit Justice Brennan's approach to minimum contacts. 93 Kennedy's challenge proceeded in a unified manner across both dimensions of the minimum contacts analysis: one argument targeted Justice Brennan's approach to the fair play and substantial justice prong of the minimum contacts test, 94 while another targeted his stream-of-commerce theory enunciated in Asahi. 93 Cf. Freer, supra note 14, at 579 ("Clearly, Brennan would find nothing to like about the Kennedy opinion."). Although best known for his role in establishing and furthering individual liberties, Justice Brennan was also notable as a proponent of wide ranging access to the federal courts. Cf. sources cited supra note 14. In the personal jurisdiction field, he wrote more opinions than any other Justice on the Court, including the majority opinion in Burger King, significant concurrences in Asahi, Burnham, and Shaffer v. Heitner, and dissents in World-Wide Volkswagen and Helicopteros. See Freer, supra note 14, at 551. In each of these opinions, Justice Brennan argued for an approach that would expand state-court personal jurisdiction in a way that provided plaintiffs greater access to the judiciary. The only exception is his four-Justice concurring opinion in Burnham, where he argues that involuntary transient defendants "tagged" by in-state service of process are entitled to the benefit of a "fairness" analysis, which could result in a denial of jurisdiction. However, Brennan would presumably also require that such a fairness analysis be utilized by plaintiffs in cases where those factors weighed heavily toward the exercise of jurisdiction. in part because of the small role the prong has played in the Supreme Court cases. 97 On its face, the phrase can mean any number of things-however, Justice White suggested a weighing of five factors to determine whether, even after a finding of minimum contacts, an exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant should be deemed consistent with the Due Process Clause. White's articulation of these factors was a long delayed response to the 1945 opinion from Justice Black in International Shoe chastising the Court for allocating to itself the power to upset a state-court exercise of jurisdiction based on an "elastic" idea of fairness, 98 even after minimum contacts had been determined.
Although identifying the fairness factors in World-Wide Volkswagen, the majority opinion by Justice White did not apply them in that case, on the evident assumption that the Court should only address them if the plaintiff had first shown minimum contacts, which were never established. 99 Thus, although never explicitly articulated by the Court, this sub silentio understanding identified the fairness factors as, in essence, a second-level defense for the defendant once the plaintiff had established some purposeful connection to the forum.
100
Dissenting in World-Wide, Justice Brennan instead saw the two prongs operating together to determine the "reasonableness" of jurisdiction.
101
Under his view, the fairness factors could be utilized not solely to provide an additional level of protection for the defendant, but could also be utilized, when coupled 96 See supra note 56. 97 The only case in which they played a dispositive role was Asahi. 98 295 (1980) . The Court held that Oklahoma could not assert jurisdiction over the New York-based regional distributor and retail seller of a car that exploded on impact in a collision that took place in Oklahoma, finding that those defendants did not benefit from the protection of Oklahoma law, and that the only contact they had with Oklahoma was the fortuitous circumstance that the plaintiff car owner had made the unilateral determination to bring the car into the Oklahoma. Id.
100 Freer, supra note 14, at 565-66. This was precisely the objection made by Justice Black-that once the sovereignty aspect of the due process clause was satisfied, the Court was without constitutional power to check the exercise of state court jurisdiction. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 325-26. Professor Freer has referred to this as a "two-step" analysis, first demanding a finding of minimum contacts, and if found, then an assessment of whether exercise of jurisdiction is fair or reasonable. Freer, supra note 14, at 567. that the exercise of jurisdiction by a Florida federal court on behalf of a multinational corporation over two Michigan-based small franchise owners in a breach of contract case violated the Due Process Clause. Instead, Brennan's majority directed defendant's argument that he would be inconvenienced by litigation in the Florida forum to the statutory and common law remedies of transfer and forum non-conveniens.
107
Asahi re-affirmed the World-Wide Volkswagen formula for assessing the interplay of minimum contacts and fair play in a complex decision that had the agreement of the entire Court, with the silent exception of Justice Scalia. Although the Court again did not explicitly articulate a two-step analysis, such an analysis proved to be dispositive of the case. First, the Court addressed whether there were sufficient minimum contacts (purposeful availment) to justify an exercise of state court jurisdiction. 108 Were the answer to that question clearly "no," as Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion asserted, jurisdiction would have failed in Asahi without analysis of the fairness factors. 109 However, there was not a majority for this resolution. 110 Rather, a majority of the Court found that there was sufficient contact to exercise jurisdiction because Asahi was aware that its valve stems were entering California in large quantities. 111 The Court was thus forced to address whether the exercise of jurisdiction was consistent with the fairness factors outlined in World-Wide Volkswagen. In so doing, and concluding that the exercise of jurisdiction was "unfair," Asahi became the first case where the fairness factors were utilized to defeat an exercise of jurisdiction. 112 Still left to be determined, however, was whether the fairness factors could be used as a basis to create jurisdiction, or at least compensate for a dearth of minimum contacts, as suggested by Justice Brennan in Burger King. 113 The J. McIntyre case provided a pristine opportunity to address this question. The plaintiff was working in his state of residence when the defendant purposefully sent its arguably defective product into the state of New Jersey through a pre-planned, nationwide distribution scheme, where it caused injury to the plaintiff. Because the distributor, McIntyre America, had declared bankruptcy, there was only one alternative forum where the litigation could have been brought, yet it was at a distant location and embedded in a foreign legal system. The facts suggest that plaintiff Nicastro was neither wealthy, nor highly educated, and that the cost of travel and other expenses necessary to litigate in a foreign jurisdiction would have been prohibitive. Moreover, New Jersey had a strong interest in the litigation because of these same facts, in addition to having a stake in enforcing a cause of action rooted in its state law [Vol. 16:269 products liability provision. 114 Indeed, the case for the plaintiff could only have been stronger if the alternative forum had been one that did not share such historic common law roots with the United States, such as China.
115
Although neither the plaintiff nor the New Jersey courts specifically addressed the fairness factors buttressing jurisdiction, 116 the explicit conclusion of the New Jersey Supreme Court that there were no minimum contacts 117 suggests that, in its view, it was suffi- 114 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-2 ("A manufacturer or seller of a product shall be liable in a product liability action only if the claimant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the product causing the harm was not reasonably fit, suitable or safe for its intended purpose because it: a. deviated from the design specifications, formulae, or performance standards of the manufacturer or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications or formulae, or b. failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions, or c. was designed in a defective manner."). 115 Justice Ginsburg was particularly concerned at oral argument as to whether, in the absence of personal jurisdiction in New Jersey, plaintiff could be relegated to something other than a "trusted legal system," particularly mentioning China, Mexico, and Russia. Justice O'Connor's approach, arguably, a manufacturer would be amenable to jurisdiction in every state that is part of its national distribution scheme." Id. at 73-74. "Because J. McIntyre knew or reasonably should have known that its distribution scheme would make its products available to New Jersey consumers, it now must present a compelling case that defending a product-liability action in New Jersey would offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id. at 79 (citations omitted).
117 Nicastro, 201 N.J. at 61. As the language of the New Jersey Supreme Court cited in note 116 suggests, to say that there were no minimum contacts is an overstatement, or at least a problematic slip of the tongue. Other than the fact that so few machines could be found in New Jersey, the case was a prototypical stream of commerce case. cient to base jurisdiction on a finding that J. McIntyre had established a distribution system, that brought its product into the New Jersey causing injury, and fairness factors pointed toward New Jersey as the appropriate forum. Viewed this way, the decision begins to look very much like Justice Brennan's assertion in Burger King that a strong showing of the fairness factors could justify an exercise of jurisdiction with a lesser showing of minimum contacts.
118
Even without argument from the named parties, Justice Kennedy explicitly rejected the possibility of asserting jurisdiction under these circumstances, concluding that an exercise of general jurisdiction must be based on submission by the defendant to state authority either by explicit consent, presence within the state, citizenship, or domicile, while specific jurisdiction must be predicated on defendant's connections or purposeful availment from the state-a desire to benefit from the protection of the state's laws.
119
This otherwise standard formulation of the law, however, was buttressed by additional prerequisites for specific jurisdiction-a requirement that the defendant's activities "manifest an intention to submit to the power of a sovereign" or "target[ ] the forum."
120
Stating that "freeform notions of fundamental fairness divorced from traditional practice cannot transform a judgment rendered in the absence of authority into law," 121 the Kennedy plurality suggested that a judgment for Nicastro by a New Jersey state court, entered absent a finding of minimum contacts, even though consistent with the fairness factors, would be a judgment made without legal authority.
122
The plurality reached this conclusion despite the indisputable evidence of a significant contact that J. McIntyre had with the state of New Jersey: a hazardous machine entered New Jersey through the actions of the defendant and caused serious injury to a New Jersey resident who was using it
The suggestion that a stream of commerce case is something other than a minimum contacts case may have been no more than a terminological misunderstanding. In any event, the decision to include the infamous paragraph was a mistake with undeterminable consequences for the plaintiff.
118 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477. 119 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2787-89 (2011) (plurality opinion) ("Furthermore, were general fairness considerations the touchstone of jurisdiction, a lack of purposeful availment might be excused where carefully crafted judicial procedures could otherwise protect the defendant's interests, or where the plaintiff would suffer substantial hardship if forced to litigate in a foreign forum." Id. at 2789.). 120 Id. at 2788. 121 Id. at 2787. 122 Id. at 2790-91.
while at work in New Jersey. As Justice Brennan had argued, the Due Process Clause bars "binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." suggests that it is extremely unlikely that he would join a concurring opinion in a close case that was based on a theory "inconsistent with the premises of lawful power." 132 129 Brennan noted:
As long as a participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise. Nor will the litigation present a burden for which there is no corresponding benefit. A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically from the retail sale of the final product in the forum State, and indirectly benefits from the State's laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity. These benefits accrue regardless of whether that participant directly conducts business in the forum State, or engages in additional conduct directed toward that State. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 130 See 444 U.S. 286, 297-98 (1980). 131 Justice White's biographer Dennis Hutchinson has observed: "Byron White believed more than most justices during his tenure that the proper focus of adjudication was on the individual case as much as on its location in larger doctrine: the lowercourt record always came first, the issue second. He was an incrementalist first and foremost, perhaps to a fault." DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZ-ZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 7 (1998). 132 Justice Kennedy states that World-Wide Volkswagen merely observes that a defendant may in an appropriate case be subject to jurisdiction without entering the forum-itself an unexceptional proposition-as where manufacturers or distributors 'seek to serve' a given State's market. . . . . . . . . . . This Court's precedents make clear that it is the defendant's actions, not his expectations, that empower a State's courts to subject him to judgment. J. McIntyre Mach., 131 S. Ct. at 2788-89 (plurality opinion). World-Wide Volkswagen, however, authorizes courts to look at a defendant's expectations as well as allow suits in states where the defendant had only targeted the market "indirectly." Again quoting Justice White:
Hence if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve directly or indirectly, the market for its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if its allegedly defective merchandise has there been the source of injury to its owner or to others. The forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that de-IV. POST-J. MCINTYRE Predictably, the cases decided since J. McIntyre reflect the confusions and tensions of that opinion. Just as the stream-of-commerce cases after Asahi could be categorized into those that followed the O'Connor plurality, those that followed the Brennan plurality, and those following neither or both, the stream-of-commerce cases after J. McIntyre follow Justice Kennedy's plurality, Justice Breyer's concurrence, or conclude that the case made no new law and thus one should either ignore it or distinguish it. Unfortunately, Breyer-based decisions do not address the applicability of Brennan's analysis when the product shipped into the forum state is not a component part as in Asahi, or an item that sells in bulk, but is rather an independent, self-standing product. what is especially noteworthy is the infrequency with which courts follow the Kennedy plurality in circumstances where doing so will require a plaintiff injured in the United States to institute litigation in a foreign jurisdiction.
A. Cases Following the J. McIntyre Plurality
In Gardner v. SPX Corp., 145 the plaintiff's husband was killed at work in Utah when a vertical dock leveler collapsed on him. Suit was filed in Utah alleging that a malfunctioning control box, a component part of the dock leveler, caused the accident. The control box was manufactured in Canada by defendant Schneider Canada, which sold "hundreds, if not thousands" of its control boxes in Canada to its various Canadian distributors, who put them in Canadian manufactured dock levelers, then sold them in the United States.
146
Schneider Canada knew that some of its control boxes were placed in dock levelers in the United States but did not know the states in which they would be installed. Schneider Canada was also unaware that the plaintiff's employer in Utah purchased forty-four of the dock levelers.
147
The court denied Utah jurisdiction over Schneider Canada, holding that the Canadian corporation did not purposefully avail itself of the Utah market. The company did not take any active steps to sell its products in Utah, and although it was aware of sales in the United States, and clause in a lease agreement between the parties that gave exclusive jurisdiction over disputes to state or federal courts in Chicago, Illinois. Borrowing language from Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion in J. McIntyre, the district court stated that the Due Process Clause protects a defendant's right to be subject only to lawful authority and noted that "a contractual forum-selection clause or choice-of-law-selection clause will not trigger unquestioning judicial acceptance" unless there is a "material rational connection . . . between any such designation and the underlying transaction." Id. at *6-7. While acknowledging that "consent" has traditionally been a basis for asserting personal jurisdiction, the court stated that nothing in the language of the forumselection clause addressed the question as to the "propriety of instituting this action in this District Court" and directed the plaintiff to address the court's concerns. Following J. McIntyre, the court reached the correct result in this case, which presented a weaker case for jurisdiction than J. McIntyre. Canada Schneider sold all of its products in Canada and there was no evidence that it had anything to do with the distribution of its components parts after they had been sold to Canadian distributors. The only connection to Utah was that one of its component products arrived in Utah and caused injury there. Not as many were sold as was the case in Asahi, nor was the product potentially hazardous. And unlike J. McIntyre, the manufacturer was not intricately involved in distribution of the product in the United States.
149
Moreover, the case came up on appeal after a jury verdict in favor of the designer of the control box, finding that the product was neither negligently designed nor unreasonably dangerous, suggesting that perhaps the appellate court could have avoided the personal jurisdiction claim altogether, and there were few, if any, fairness factors pointing toward jurisdiction. 149 Justice Kennedy's plurality noted that the U.S. distributor "structured [its] advertising and sales efforts in accordance with" J. McIntyre's "direction and guidance whenever possible," and that "at least some of the machines were sold on consignment to" the distributor. Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 201 N.J. 48, 55-56 (2010) . 150 Although the trial court ruled that there was no jurisdiction over Schneider Canada, the case proceeded to trial against SPX, one of the designers of the control box. The jury found that the control box was not negligently designed nor did its design make the product unreasonably dangerous. Gardner, 272 P.3d at 178. Schneider Canada argued that this jury determination mooted the appeal against it; the Court of Appeals held that its lack of jurisdiction determination mooted that argument. Applying this reasoning to the facts of the case, the court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments for jurisdiction in Maryland. Noting that the plaintiffs demonstrated that the defendant marketed the skewer throughout the United States, the court was concerned that the plaintiffs had failed to show "additional conduct" that would evince an intent by the defendant to serve the Maryland bicycle market in particular. 158 Rather than dismiss the case, however, the court allowed plaintiff additional discovery, suggesting that the plaintiff might be able to secure jurisdiction if discovery showed that the defendant used distributors who maintained channels of distribution in the state of Maryland. 159 In an unusual aside, the court noted its personal view that "indeed the reasoning of the dissenters in J. McIntyre, represents the most sensible approach to personal jurisdiction in the context of global commerce." 160 Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion was also followed in Lindsey v. Cargotec USA, Inc., 161 a case involving an Irish corporation (Moffett Engineering Ltd.) sued in Kentucky. The plaintiff employee was injured when a defective forklift manufactured in Ireland and sold in the U.S. by a distributor (Cargotec) ran over his leg. The plaintiff's federal suit alleged that a design flaw of the forklift blocked the visual field of the driver. After summarizing Asahi and J. McIntyre, the court concluded that the decision in J. McIntyre did not change preexisting law and that the court was therefore bound by prior Sixth Circuit precedent, which had previously adopted Jus-ucts liability case were the survivors of a Mississippi decedent who sued the Irish Company (Moffett) in Mississippi after the decedent was struck and killed by a forklift designed and manufactured by Moffett. Here, as in the Kentucky case, the defendant never maintained a physical presence in Mississippi; did not own, possess, or use any property in Mississippi; had no officers, employees, or agents stationed in Mississippi; and did not send any of its employees to Mississippi for business purposes. It never sought authority from the Mississippi Secretary of State to conduct business in Mississippi, nor had it ever directly shipped or sold any of its forklifts to customers there or directly solicited business from any company located in Mississippi. 166 As in Lindsay, the defendant Irish corporation sold all of its forklifts to its co-defendant Cargotec USA, Inc, an American company that, by contract, had the exclusive right to market and sell Moffett's product throughout the United States. Cargotec sold and marketed Moffett forklifts in all fifty states, with no territorial limitations, and handled all the communications with end purchasers, so Moffett was not aware of their identities or locations. Moffett personnel traveled to the United States two or three times a year to discuss products and sales forecasts with Cargotec personnel, and additionally, traveled to the United States periodically for trade shows. 167 Emphasizing Justice Breyer's concurrence, the district court noted that Breyer "declined to choose between the Asahi plurality opinions." Although the number of products entering Mississippi was substantially greater than in J. McIntyre, a strict adherence to Justice Ken- 166 Id. at *2. 167 Id. at *1-5. 168 Id. at *19. 169 where jurisdiction was allowed in Pennsylvania over an Italian marble slab producer who, through its distributor, sold heavy, negligently packaged marble slabs to a Philadelphia company. The slabs weighed thousands of pounds and the plaintiff suffered severe leg injuries when the slabs of a container dislodged because they were improperly loaded. The Italian defendant, Margraf S.P.A., produced, packaged, and loaded the containers and distributed them to Gemstar-an Ontario, Canada companywhich then sold the slabs to the plaintiff's Philadelphia employer, Belfi Brothers. The marble slabs were shipped to at least seventy United States locations since 2007, with at least three going to Pennsylvania, including one in 2010 valued at over $19,000, and dozens to other states in the Northeast.
174
The court asserted jurisdiction on the basis that Margraf knowingly shipped its products into Pennsylvania on at least three occasions for pecuniary gain, thus purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, and invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. The court noted the additional shipments to New Jersey, New York, Maryland, and other neighboring states and concluded that "[b]y disseminating their monopoly product throughout Pennsylvania and many neighboring states, the Defendants obtained an economic benefit in Pennsylvania and could thus have reasonably anticipate [d] problem with this analysis, however, is that the court specifically notes that the sales to Pennsylvania resulting in plaintiff's injuries were made not by Margraf, but rather by Gemstar, the Canadian distributor.
177
The court also does not specify whether the sales to states outside of Pennsylvania were made by the Italian defendants, Margraf, or by Gemstar. Under this contrary reading of the facts, neither Margraf nor J. McIntyre shipped anything into the forum state. In both cases, the shipment and sale was by the distributor. The decision thus runs afoul of the J. McIntyre plurality decision, which looks for evidence that the defendant "targeted" or intended to submit to the jurisdiction of the forum state. 178 Jurisdiction, however, perhaps could be asserted pursuant to Justice Breyer's analysis, under the assumption that the three shipments into Pennsylvania by the distributor would satisfy Breyer's threshold.
Another federal district court refusal to follow the Kennedy plurality is DRAM Technologies v. America II Group, Inc., 179 a patent infringement action filed in Texas federal court against Elite Semiconductor, a Taiwanese manufacturer of semiconductor chips. These chips were sold to manufacturers of consumer electronics products outside the United States, who incorporated the allegedly infringing chips into their products, before shipping them to markets worldwide, including the United States, one of the largest consumer electronics markets in the world. Elite Semiconductor was aware that its chips were being used in these devices and that its products were entering the United States via electronics companies. Between 2005 and 2010, Elite Semiconductor shipped approximately 1.02 million packaged memory chips directly to electronics customers in the United States, though none of them was shipped directly into Texas. Some of the chips were contained in electronics products that were on sale in Texas retail stores and available on Internet sites that shipped the products directly into Texas. In addition, Elite Semiconductor's employees regularly visited several of its United States-based customers and, at one time, had a United States affiliate, until it was closed in 2007. [Vol. 16:269 After summarizing the plurality and concurring and opinions in J. McIntyre, the court concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper under the plurality opinion as well as under the concurring opinion because a substantial number of the infringing semiconductor chips had entered into Texas as incorporated into electronic devices, notwithstanding the defendants' objections that there was no evidence that any of semiconductor chips themselves had been sold by the defendant in Texas. 181 The Court noted that even if J. McIntyre imposed some kind of "heightened scrutiny" requirement, the Court would allow plaintiff to conduct additional discovery, rather than dismiss the action. 182 On its facts, DRAM Technologies is very similar to Asahi, but it is unclear that jurisdiction would have been upheld under Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion. The defendant manufactured its semiconductor chips and knowingly sold them to electronics companies that sent them all over the world, including the United States and Texas. But there was no evidence of any of the additional conduct demanded by O'Connor's Asahi plurality, 183 or any indications that DRAM Technologies specifically targeted the Texas market or manifested an intention to submit to the sovereignty of Texas as demanded by the Kennedy plurality in J. McIntyre. 184 The facts, however, would have been sufficient for jurisdiction under the Brennan view in Asahi because the defendant was responsible for a steady product stream consisting of large numbers of its components that entered the state of Texas as well as other places throughout the United States. The number was large enough to also satisfy Justice Breyer's concurrence in J. McIntyre because there was a steady stream of products entering the forum state. 185 
C. State Court Resistance
There are also signs in the state courts of resistance to the plurality opinion in J. McIntyre. In Soria v. Chrysler Can., Inc., 186 an Illinois plaintiff bought suit in an Illinois state court against Chrysler Canada, a Canadian automobile manufacturer, after losing her sight in an automobile accident that she alleged was caused by a defective minivan airbag module. Chrysler Canada was incorporated in Canada, had its principal place of business in Canada, and had never transacted business, entered into contracts, owned real estate, maintained a corporate presence, or had a telephone number, tax identification number, or employees or agents in Illinois. Further, it contended that it did not ship, deliver, distribute, or sell the minivan in Illinois, and that its website was not directed to or interactive with Illinois residents.
187
Chrysler Canada assembled the minivan based on Chrysler United States' specifications and, once it assembled and tested the vehicle, sold it to Chrysler United States. Chrysler United States imported the vehicle to the United States and made the decision to ship the vehicle to Illinois. In this respect, Chrysler Canada argued, it did not control or determine where the vehicle was to be marketed, sold, or distributed in the United States. Further, it did not decide upon warnings for the minivan or conduct compliance testing.
188
After summarizing the relevant opinions, including some under state law, the court upheld the trial court's conclusion that Illinois could exercise jurisdiction. Purporting to use "either version of the stream-of-commerce theory" the court concluded that J. McIntyre did not control the case because Chrysler Canada "was specifically aware of the final destination of every product (i.e., vehicle) that it assembles," 189 and "that it 'expected' that some of its vehicles would be sold in Illinois."
190
The court's use of this particular terminology is especially noteworthy in light of the J. McIntyre plurality's noted displeasure with those exact terms.
191
So this decision also does not fit within the language of the plurality in J. McIntyre. There is nothing in the Court opinion that suggests that Chrysler Canada "targeted" or "intended to submit to the jurisdiction of Illinois." The court held that Chrysler Canada targeted the United States market that included Illinois and noted that Chrysler Canada shipped over 28,000 vehicles to Illinois dealerships. But there was nothing, other than this huge volume of shipments, suggesting that Chrysler Canada specifically targeted Illinois. Again, it seems 187 Id. at 290. 188 Id. 189 Id. at 297-98. 190 193 No Sumatra employee ever traveled to Tennessee for the purpose of conducting business, or initiated contact with any individual or entity in Tennessee, nor did the company sell cigarettes directly in Tennessee or through any agent in Tennessee. It did not use a distributor to sell cigarettes in Tennessee, did not advertise in Tennessee, had no agents in Tennessee, and produced no promotional materials to be used in Tennessee. 194 After the trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the appellate court reversed in a decision remarkably similar in its reasoning to the Nicastro New Jersey Supreme Court decision. 195 The court noted that Sumatra not only placed its product into the stream of commerce-it intentionally decided to market its product nationwide with the goal of mass distribution to all fifty states by having its distributors market its product in each and every state. Moreover, Sumatra was aware of the fact that its chosen distribution system was very likely to result in Sumatra's products being sold in every state, and, in fact, this was Sumatra's goal. Furthermore, Sumatra took no steps to exclude Tennessee from selling its products so as to evidence an intent to limit its distribution market in any way. In fact, Sumatra did just the opposite in seeking to distribute its product into all fifty states. 196 It was undisputed that, supreme court preferred to go back to pre-Asahi opinions by Justice Brennan in Burger King and Justice White in World-Wide Volkswagen-neither of whom, for illumination, was part of the O'Connor plurality in Asahi. 214 In essence, the decisions upholding jurisdiction are reaching conclusions consistent with a majority in J. McIntyre consisting of Justices Breyer, Alito, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 215 Of the cases discussed, only one directly followed the plurality opinion, and that case was virtually indistinguishable from the facts of J. McIntyre. 216 A second case with distinguishable facts followed the J. McIntyre plurality, but rather than dismiss, ordered more discovery, meanwhile noting its dissatisfaction with the plurality rule. 217 Another case followed the plurality opinion in J. McIntyre because that opinion was consistent with preexisting Sixth Circuit precedent that followed the O'Connor test in Asahi. 218 Yet in a case in an adjacent circuit, a district court, dealing with the same defendant in a case of similar injuries, did not follow the J. McIntyre plurality, reasoning that the plurality opinion provided no basis to depart from Fifth Circuit precedent that followed the Brennan opinion in Asahi. 219 Other state and federal courts that have been presented with international stream-of-commerce issues have come up with reasons for declining to follow the J. McIntyre plurality.
we look at these cases along with those cited in the appendix to Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion, the true outlier in this area of law is the plurality opinion in J. McIntyre itself. What seems to be driving these decisions is a demonstrable reluctance to direct plaintiffs who have been injured by products imported into their state of residence to foreign tribunals for adjudications of their claims. The rationale that best explains them is some kind of amalgamation of the New Jersey Supreme Court decision in Nicastro, along with Brennan's and Stevens' opinions in Asahi.
CONCLUSION
One should not underestimate the significance of the decision in J. McIntyre. As Justice Ginsburg stated, the extremely harsh rule implemented by Justice Kennedy's plurality opinion is not the rule of the Court, but it will be if Justices Breyer or Alito later adopt its reasoning. 221 As this Article has shown, most lower-court judges deciding personal jurisdiction motions in the aftermath of J. McIntyre have resisted Justice Kennedy's plurality view-these decisions should be affirmed and encouraged because they reflect an analysis which is more consistent with the views adopted by a majority of the Court. The number of international stream-of-commerce cases raising personal jurisdiction issues currently in litigation strongly suggests that international companies seeking to target the United States market, yet avoid U.S. law, will structure their operations to conform to the rules established in the Kennedy plurality. Trial judges presiding over those cases have doctrinal and procedural arguments available that will enable them to prevent future plaintiffs from sharing the unfortunate experience of Robert Nicastro, and should utilize them.
